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Student evaluations of teaching
Gender biases
Field experimenta b s t r a c t
This paper presents the results of a field experiment designed to reduce gender discrimination in student
evaluations of teaching (SET). In the first intervention, students receive a normative statement reminding
them that they should not discriminate in SETs. In the second intervention, the normative statement
includes precise information about how other students (especially male students) have discriminated
against female teachers in previous years. The purely normative statement has no significant impact
on SET overall satisfaction scores, suggesting that a blanket awareness-raising campaign may be ineffi-
cient to reduce discrimination. However, the informational statement appears to significantly reduce
gender discrimination. The effect we find mainly comes from a change in male students’ evaluation of
female teachers.
 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Anti-bias awareness-raising campaigns are a common strategy
that organizations use to reduce discrimination in the evaluations
of employees and job candidates. These campaigns often convey a
normative message highlighting how discrimination is wrong,
unfair and should be avoided. Are such norm-setting strategies
effective? Perhaps not, given that the biases driving discrimination
are largely unconscious (Bertrand et al., 2005; Rooth, 2010;
Oreopoulos, 2011; Glover et al., 2017). Individuals who discrimi-
nate may not believe that the normative message applies to their
own behavior, because they may not be conscious of their own
biases when they evaluate others. Including information to make
biases conscious may therefore be a necessary condition for anti-
bias awareness-raising campaigns to be effective.
This paper provides the result of a field experiment designed to
test the impact of two types of awareness-raising campaigns—one
with information to generate bias awareness, and one without—in
the context of gender discrimination in student evaluations ofteaching (SETs). This context resembles a common principle-
agent problem, where an employer relies on information provided
by a third party (such as managers, coworkers or clients) to evalu-
ate an employee’s performance and make personnel decisions. The
principal would like to rely on unbiased information to make
discrimination-free decisions. In the higher educational context,
universities frequently rely on information from SETs for decisions
involving the retention and promotion of instructors. However,
studies from different countries provide empirical evidence that
students can be biased in their evaluations of female instructors:
in the U.S. (Arbuckle and Williams, 2003; MacNell et al., 2015),
France (Boring et al., 2016; Boring, 2017), the Netherlands
(Wagner et al., 2016; Mengel et al., 2019), Switzerland (Funk
et al., 2019), and Australia (Fan et al., 2019) for instance. Universi-
ties worldwide therefore have a clear interest in reducing gender
biases in SET scores to avoid making discriminatory personnel
decisions.
We conducted the experiment in a French university where a
study found evidence of gender biases in SET scores in previous
years (Boring, 2017). The administration sent two different emails
to students during the evaluation period. One email—the ‘‘purely
normative” treatment—encouraged students to be careful not
to discriminate in SETs. The other email—the ‘‘informational”
1 ‘‘Recruitment Bias in Research Institutes”: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
g978T58gELo.
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included the same statement as the purely normative treatment,
plus information from the study on gender biases in SETs. The mes-
sage contained precise information on the presence of gender
biases in SET scores in previous years at that university, including
the fact that male students were particularly biased in favor of
male teachers. The goal of this second treatment was to make
the treated students explicitly aware of their own potential gender
biases, by identifying with former students of the same university.
We created a difference-in-difference setting using the univer-
sity’s seven separate campuses. The students of two campuses
were defined as controls: they did not receive any email during
the three-week evaluation period. Three other campuses were
treated with the normative message. The two remaining campuses
were treated with the informational message. The administration
sent the emails after some students had already completed their
evaluations. This design provides us with a pre-treatment period
for all campuses. Finally, the emails were sent to a random half
of the students in each of the treatment campuses. This feature
allows us to measure spillover effects of the treatments within
campuses for the students who completed their SETs after the
emails were sent. Campuses are located in different cities, which
limits spillover effects between campuses: students communicate
within campuses, but rarely across campuses.
Difference-in-difference analyses by teacher gender indicate
that the purely normative treatment had no significant impact on
reducing biases in SET scores. However, the informational treat-
ment significantly reduced the gender gap in SET scores, by
increasing the scores of female teachers. Overall satisfaction scores
for female teachers increased by about 0.30 points (between 0.08
and 0.52 for the confidence interval at 5%), which represents
around 30% of a standard error. The informational treatment did
not have a significant impact on the scores of male teachers. These
results are confirmed by a triple-difference analysis, in which we
include all campuses and teachers. In all robustness checks, the
informational treatment remains significant: when we compare
campuses separately, when we look at men and women separately
within each campus, and when we use the year before the exper-
iment as control. Each strategy rests on slightly different hypothe-
ses, but results remain consistent.
While the gender gap drops substantially, it does not close com-
pletely. In the campuses that received the informational treatment,
the gender gap decreased by 0.09 points after the treatment, which
represents a 47% decrease (from 0.19 to 0.10). This drop contrasts
with an increase in the gender gap in the control group of 0.11
points, between before and after the moment the emails were sent
on the treatment campuses. Over the same period in the year
before, the gap had also increased (0.12 points) in the campuses
where we ran the informational treatment. While these calcula-
tions are based on specifications using teacher fixed effects, they
are indicative of the extent towhich the bias can be reduced by such
an intervention. The reduction in the gender gap following the
informational email seems to be driven bymale students increasing
their scores for female teachers. On the informational treatment
campuses, male students’ mean ratings of female teachers
increased from 2.89 to 3.20 after the emails were sent. This large
increase in their scores to female teachers contributed to reducing
the gap. There is no evidence that the informational email created
(positive) discrimination by female students. Furthermore, the
scores of the higher quality female teachers (those who generated
more learning) seem to have been more positively impacted by
the informational email. The effect of this treatment appears to
have survived in the medium run, for the spring semester courses.
Finally, we find that the informational treatment had important
spillover effects. On informational treatment campuses, we find an
impact on students who received the email and on students who2
did not receive the email. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this
email sparked conversations between students within campuses,
de facto treating other students. We find weak empirical evidence
of a small delay in the effect on students who did not directly
receive the email. Information gathering (learning) following the
informational treatment could therefore explain our results. We
believe that these discussions probably contributed to making this
treatment effective, whereas students in the other treated cam-
puses are likely to have largely ignored the purely normative mes-
sage. The persistence of the informational treatment effect in the
medium run also appears to be more consistent with a learning
explanation than with a purely behavioral explanation, and makes
an experimenter demand mechanism unlikely. Furthermore, we
test the effect of providing norms, with and without information,
in a context where student behavior remains private information,
therefore limiting the potential impact of a Hawthorne effect.
Indeed, students complete their SETs online anonymously, thus
excluding public scrutiny of their behavior as a possible mecha-
nism to explain these results. However, since the informational
email was longer and more precise than the normative email, we
cannot fully rule out explanations based on saliency (the discrim-
ination issue was more salient in the informational treatment) or
priming (male students were specifically targeted in the informa-
tional treatment).
Our approach and setting have some limitations. In particular,
the small number of treatment units limits statistical power. The
mechanisms (learning, priming or saliency) are also difficult to dis-
entangle. The results nonetheless convey important policy implica-
tions: while purely normative awareness-raising campaigns may
be ineffective, including precise information on people’s behavior
can reduce discrimination. Such awareness-raising campaigns
could have important spillover effects, but do not seem to create
other forms of discrimination.
This paper contributes to the literature on the efficiency of
interventions designed to reduce discrimination. Past research
has shown that being directly informed of one’s own biases through
the use of implicit association tests seems to be an efficient strat-
egy in the lab (Paluck and Green, 2009) and in the field (Alesina
et al., 2018), although the evidence is still scant (Moss-Racusin
et al. 2014; Bertrand and Duflo 2017). In our experiment, we study
what happens when students are informed indirectly about their
potential biases, using information from academic research. Impor-
tantly, we do not use a direct blaming and shaming approach,
which the literature in other fields suggests may be counterpro-
ductive, for instance in firms’ diversity trainings (Dobbin and
Kalev, 2016).
Past research has focused on other strategies to reduce discrim-
ination, through changes in the settings or rules in which firms
make discriminatory decisions: organizing ‘‘blind auditions”
(Goldin and Rouse, 2000), increasing the number of women in hir-
ing committees (Kunze and Miller, 2017; Bagues, et al., 2017),
using joint evaluations (Bohnet et al., 2015), and anti-
discrimination laws (Collins, 2003, 2004). Our paper shows that
providing information on people’s behavior–a relatively easy strat-
egy to implement–can be effective. In a recent lab experiment,
Mengel (2020) tests an intervention similar to ours in the context
of committee deliberations, and also finds that providing informa-
tion on biases can be effective. These results suggest that real life
interventions, such as informing committee members conducting
interviews for European Research Council (ERC) grants about gen-
der biases in recruitment committee decisions,1 may effectively
reduce discrimination.
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impact of a research-based awareness-raising campaign that arose
following the publication of an NBER research paper by Price and
Wolfers (2007) providing evidence of out-group bias in the fouls
that referees call out in NBA games. Using a pre-post analysis,
the authors find that the article’s wide media attention caused a
drop in discrimination in the following seasons (2007–2010). Our
results shed light on mechanisms through which such
awareness-raising campaigns can work in reducing biases in eval-
uations, by focusing exclusively on the change in behavior of the
individuals who evaluate. Only students are treated in our context,
whereas both those who evaluate (referees) and those who are
being evaluated (players) are treated in the Pope et al. (2018)
setting.
Finally, our results relate to the literature on the effectiveness of
treatments aiming at inducing pro-social behavior through infor-
mation (Asensio et al., 2014; Ida et al., 2013; Allcott and Rogers,
2014; Yoeli et al. 2013).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the exper-
iment. Section 3 presents the identification strategy and Section 4
the main results. Section 5 discusses the possible mechanisms. Sec-
tion 6 concludes.2. The experiment
2.1. Institutional setting
The field experiment took place in a selective French university
specialized in social sciences (similar to a liberal arts school in the
U.S.), in the fall semester of the 2015–16 academic year, on a
cohort of 1570 students. Several features of the university’s first
year undergraduate studies are useful for the experiment. First,
all first-year students must follow mandatory courses in history,
political institutions, and microeconomics in the fall semester,
and macroeconomics, political science, and sociology in the spring
semester. Each course consists in two hours a week of a large lec-
ture, plus two hours of classwork in small groups called seminars.
The SET scores we analyze are from seminar courses, as there are
many teachers, with enough variation in teacher gender (men
teach most main lectures).
Second, we take advantage of the fact that undergraduate stu-
dents are in seven separate campuses in different cities. Whereas
each campus focuses on a different geopolitical area, students take
the same mandatory courses in all campuses. At the end of their
three years of study, all students receive the same degree in social
sciences.
Third, the administration makes it mandatory for students to
complete SETs online at the end of each semester. SETs take place
over a three-week period, (the two final weeks of classes and the
review week before final exams). By then, students have a good
idea of what their continuous assessment grade will be, but not
their overall course average (final grades are a weighted average
of the continuous assessment and final exam grades). Furthermore,
SETs remain anonymous to the teachers, who cannot trace back
SET scores to individual students. Students who do not complete
their SETs are unable to register for the following semester, thus
guaranteeing a very high response rate. The same survey is used
on all campuses (the questionnaire is in Appendix A).
Finally, a study on SETs in the Paris campus showed evidence of
gender biases against female teachers in previous academic years
(2008–2013) (Boring, 2017), with male students being particularly
biased in favor of male teachers. Overall satisfaction scores were
biased, as well as scores on different teaching dimensions. The
dimensions that students valued in men and women tended to cor-
respond to gender stereotypes. For example, women obtained3
higher scores in teaching dimensions such as course preparation
and organization, while men scored higher on ‘‘contribution to
intellectual development” and class leadership skills.
2.2. Treatments
The university’s administration approved our experiment. We
also received approval from J-Pal’s Institutional Review Board
(Appendix B).
The experiment consisted in sending two different emails to
students. The normative treatment (‘‘treatment one”) encouraged
students to avoid discrimination, especially gender discrimination
(the full English version of the email in Appendix C). The email
started with a generic statement about how evaluations are impor-
tant to help the administration prepare courses for the following
year. It then encouraged students to avoid discrimination, focusing
more specifically on gender discrimination:
‘‘Considering the importance of these evaluations, we would like to
remind you that your evaluations must exclusively focus on the
quality of the teaching and must not be influenced by criteria such
as the instructor’s gender, age or ethnicity. We ask you to pay close
attention to these discrimination issues when completing your stu-
dent evaluations. The goal is to avoid a situation in which, for
instance, gender-based biases or stereotypes would systematically
generate lower evaluations for women instructors compared to
their male colleagues.”
This treatment resembles many anti-bias awareness-raising
campaigns, whose main message is that ‘‘individuals should not
discriminate”. If biased individuals are not conscious that they dis-
criminate, we hypothesize that this type of message is unlikely to
be effective.
The informational treatment (‘‘treatment two”) added precise
information to the normative statement. It explicitly stated that
students had applied gender biases in the past, in the same context.
By making treated students identify with students who were
biased in the past, we hypothesize that this treatment may reveal
to the treated students that they also might be biased. The second
email (see Appendix C) drew students’ attention to the working
paper by Boring (2015), ‘‘which suggests the existence of gender
biases against female instructors of first year undergraduate seminars
for all fundamental courses”. The email contained a link to the work-
ing paper, and presented its main results:
‘‘the results of this study show that students tend to give lower rat-
ings to their female instructors despite the fact that students per-
form equally well on final exams, whether their seminar
instructor was a man or a woman. Male students in particular tend
to rate male instructors higher in their student evaluations,
although a slight bias by female students also exists. The differences
in SET scores do not appear to be justified by other measures of
teaching quality, such as an instructor’s ability to make their stu-
dents succeed on their final exams.”
The message included a graph showing that overall satisfaction
scores were unrelated to student performance on the final exam,
and that male students consistently gave higher overall satisfac-
tion scores to male teachers. The email ended with the same nor-
mative statement as in treatment one.
2.3. Design
To measure the effects of the two treatments, we take advan-
tage of the fact that the university has separate campuses. While
students know each other quite well within each campus,
they rarely communicate between campuses, enabling us to send
Fig. 1. Design of the experiment. Note: the numbers indicate the number of observations in the dataset (i.e. the number of evaluations). The black bar indicates the moment
when the administration sent the emails. The campuses included in each group are indicated on the left-hand side.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics on students and teachers.
Mean S.d.
Panel A. Students
Share of women 0.60 0.49
Age 18.17 0.79
Continuous assessment (seminar) grade 139.86 22.46
Final exam grade 116.81 34.35
Share of students with French citizenship 0.73 0.44
Share of students admitted through specific procedure 0.10 0.31
Share of students admitted through entry exam (French
high school)
0.46 0.50
Share of students admitted through international procedure 0.32 0.47
Share of students admitted through dual degree with a
foreign university
0.08 0.27
Share of students admitted through dual degree with a
French university
0.02 0.16
Share of students in a regular degree 0.79 0.41
Share of students in a dual degree with a foreign university 0.10 0.30
Share of students in a dual degree with a French university 0.11 0.31
Panel B. Teachers
Share of women 0.39 0.49
Overall satisfaction scores 3.13 0.89
Share of ‘‘excellent” overall satisfaction scores 0.40 0.49
Share of ‘‘good” overall satisfaction scores 0.38 0.49
Share of ‘‘average” overall satisfaction scores 0.15 0.36
Share of ‘‘insufficient” overall satisfaction scores 0.06 0.24
History overall satisfaction scores 3.21 0.82
Microeconomics overall satisfaction scores 3.08 0.91
Political institutions overall satisfaction scores 3.09 0.93
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the design of the experiment. The first treatment group includes
students from three campuses: Menton (102 students), Poitiers
(86 students) and Reims (337 students). We assigned the purely
normative email to this group of students. The second treatment
group includes students from the campuses in Le Havre (131 stu-
dents) and Paris (657 students). We assigned the informational
email to students from this second group. The other two campuses,
Dijon (101 students) and Nancy (155 students), are the control
group campuses. Each student completes three evaluations (one
for each seminar). The dataset includes a total of 1509 evaluations
for treatment one (95.8% response rate), 2331 evaluations for treat-
ment two (98.5% response rate), and 656 evaluations for the con-
trol group (85.4% response rate).
We sent the emails to half the students on the treatment cam-
puses. Before the beginning of the experiment, we randomly
selected the students who would receive the emails. We use the
following notations: group C is the control group; group TT1 (treat-
ment treated one) includes all students who received the purely
normative email; TC1 (treatment control one) includes all students
who did not receive the email, but who were on the campuses that
were treated with the purely normative email; TT2 and TC2 are
similar to TT1 and TC1, but for the informational treatment
campuses.
The university’s gender equality officer sent the two emails
simultaneously on a Friday evening, about one week after the
beginning of the three-week evaluation period. Roughly one fifth
of the evaluations had been completed by then: 20.9% in treatment
one (normative) and 22.2% in treatment two (informational). In
each treated campus, some evaluations were therefore completed
before the treatment.
2.4. Data
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the main student
and teacher-related variables. 60% of the students are women.
Almost all students are 18 years old. Students received higher con-
tinuous assessment grades (nearly 14 out of 20, on average), than
final exam grades (11.7 out of 20, on average). Most students are
French (73%). Finally, 32% of students were admitted through the
international procedure, 10% of students were admitted through
a specific procedure designed for students coming from lower
income areas of France, and 46% were admitted through the main
admissions procedure. The remaining students were admitted
through a dual degree procedure.
A total of 155 teachers were evaluated during the fall semester:
20 in the control group, 39 in treatment one, and 96 in treatment
two. Of these teachers, 39% are women (8 in the control group,
18 in treatment one, and 31 in treatment two). All but two teachers
were evaluated both before and after the administration sent the4
emails. Most teachers obtained overall satisfaction scores that stu-
dents qualified as ‘‘excellent” (39%) or ‘‘good” (40%). Only 6%
received ‘‘insufficient”, and 15% ‘‘average”, overall satisfaction
scores. Teachers generally teach on only one campus.3. Identification strategies
The experimental design includes features that enable us to use
difference-in-difference and triple-difference analyses to measure
the direct and indirect effects of the treatments. First, some cam-
puses are treated while others are control. Second, evaluated
teachers could be male or female. Third, on the treated campuses,
some students had already completed their evaluations by the
time the emails were sent, generating a pretreatment period.
Fourth, only half of the students (random draw) received emails
on the treatment campuses.3.1. Difference-in-difference
In our first analysis, we eliminate any spillover effects by only
including students from groups C, TT1 and TT2, i.e. the control
A. Boring and A. Philippe Journal of Public Economics 193 (2021) 104323group and the groups in which students received emails. We
exclude TC1 and TC2, i.e. the groups that could be affected by spil-
lover effects.
Using groups C, TT1 and TT2, we run standard difference-in-
difference regressions on female and male teachers separately.
We use regressions of the form:
SETs;te;t ¼ b0 þ b1  TT1þ b2  TT2þ b3  postt þ b4  TT1
 postt þ b5  TT2  postt þ c  Xs þ dte þ es;te;t ð1Þ
where SETs;te;t is the evaluation of teacher te by student s at time t;
postt is a dummy equal to one if t is after the mailing campaign; TT1
and TT2 are the two treatment groups; Xs are controls for student
characteristics (gender, age, grades, nationality, admissions proce-
dure); and dte are teacher fixed effects. Including teacher fixed
effects overcomes the potential bias due to correlations between
timing and teachers’ characteristics.2 Our variables of interest are
b4, which measures the effect of the normative treatment, and b5,
which measures the effect of the informational treatment.
Second, we measure the spillover effects of the treatments
thanks to the two groups of students (TC1 and TC2) who did not
receive an email, but who studied on the treatment campuses.
We compare the SET scores of the students who belong to TC1
and TC2 after the mailing campaign, with the control, TT1 and
TT2 groups. We run regressions of the form:
SETs;te;t ¼ b0 þ b1  TT1þ b2  TC1þ b3  TT2þ b4  TC2þ b5
 postt þ b6  TT1  postt þ b7  TT2  postt þ b8
 TC1  postt þ b9  TC2  postt þ c  Xs þ dte þ es;te;t ð2Þ
where variables are similar to those in equation (1).
As in equation (1), b6 and b7 capture the effects of the emails on
those who received them. In addition, b8 and b9 measure the spil-
lover effects of the emails on TC1 and TC2. In equation (4) we are
interested in the magnitude and statistical significance of b8 and
b9, as well as in their differences with b6 and b7 (respectively). If
b8 and/or b9 are equal to zero, then this would mean that the
emails had no spillover effects. If b8 (resp. b9) is not statistically dif-
ferent from b6 (resp. b7), this would mean that the spillover effect
was complete. We run equation (2) separately for female and male
teachers.
Lastly, we measure the net effect of the treatments, i.e. the
effect of the treatments on those who received email one or email
two, and students around them. We run equation (1) with T1 and
T2 instead of TT1 and TT2. This specification is especially interest-
ing if the treatments had a very large spillover effect, and if TT1/
TC1 and TT2/TC2 are very close.
3.2. Triple difference-in-difference
We measure the effect of the treatments in one single triple
difference-in-difference. As the results are harder to read when
using a triple difference-in-difference, we only use this strategy
to measure the net effect of the treatment. We do so by running
regressions of the form:2 The results could be affected if the timing of the evaluation is correlated with
students’ characteristics. First, we control for observable characteristics in all
regressions. Second, we include student fixed effects (in models presented in the
appendix material). Including student fixed effects presents several limitations. It
drastically reduces the power of the regressions by introducing numerous fixed
effects. Also, because students mainly complete all their evaluations for the semester
on the same day, we could only measure the effect if we used both the fall and the
spring semester. The identification would come from the difference between the two
semesters’ scores among students who filled their evaluations for the fall semester
before the treatments. For this reason, we do not use models with student fixed
effects as our main specification, even though the results are similar.
5
SETs;te;t ¼ b0 þ b1 Womante þ b2  postt þ b3  T1þ b4  T2
þ b5  postt Womante þ b6  postt  T1þ b7  postt
 T2þ b8 Womante  T1þ b9 Womante  T2þ b10
 postt  T1 Womante þ b11  postt  T2 Womante
þ c  Xs þ d  Zte þ es;te;t ð3Þ
where variables are similar to those in equation (1).
In this equation, b8 and b9 capture the effect of the treatment on
both male and female teachers. b10 and b11 capture the additional
effect of the treatment on women in campuses of the treatment
one and two (respectively).
Our identification strategy relies on the fact that the differences
between students who completed their evaluations before and
after the emails were sent are similar across groups. In Table 2
we test this hypothesis by running balancing checks on observable
characteristics. We run our main regression – the triple difference-
in-difference presented in Equation (3) – on observable character-
istics instead of our main outcome (i.e. overall satisfaction scores).
Table 2 confirms that our treatments are not correlated with
observable characteristics. Out of eight regressions and 16 relevant
coefficients – ‘‘post*female*T1” and ‘‘post*female*T2” – only two
are marginally significant. Overall, students’ characteristics do
not seem to be correlated with the treatments.3
3.3. Alternative specifications
These strategies allow us to extract all the variations created by
our design, and to compare the effect on male and female teachers.
They are therefore our favorite specifications. We add two alterna-
tive strategies that can also shed light on our main results. First, we
run difference-in-difference regressions in control, treatment one
or treatment two campuses with female teachers as treatment,
and male teachers as control. We regress teachers’ SET scores on
postt , postt Womante and teacher fixed effects for each campus
type (control, treatment one, treatment two).
Second, we use students’ evaluations from the previous year.
This strategy enables us to run separate triple difference-in-
difference analyses for each campus or each campus group (con-
trol, treatment one, treatment two). The three dimensions of the
triple difference-in-differences are: a dummy equal to one if the
teacher is a woman, a dummy equal to one if the evaluation is
the year of the experiment, and a dummy equal to one if the eval-
uation is completed in the last two weeks of the evaluation period.
The main advantage of these specifications is that, by treating
campuses or groups separately, the results could not be driven
by cultural differences or sample size issues (the informational
treatment group being larger than the two other groups). The main
drawback is that they rely on the assumption that male teachers
are a good control group.4 The results of these alternative strategies
are in the appendix.4. Main effects
4.1. Graphical evidence
In Fig. 2, we present the evolution of the average overall satis-
faction scores by teacher gender, groups (treatment two, treatment3 We do find, however, that students who complete their evaluations later tend to
be lower performing students, in all campuses, as can be seen in the descriptive
statistics by treatment group, and before versus after emails, in the appendix
Table D1.
4 Another reason why we do not present these alternative models in the core of the
paper is that we had not mentioned them in the approval document we submitted to
J-Pal’s Institutional Review Board.
Table 2
Balancing checks.

















post 0.0044 3.83 5.48*** 0.017 0.25*** 0.0047 0.035 0.033
(0.056) (3.32) (2.03) (0.058) (0.097) (0.016) (0.048) (0.051)
post*T1 0.042 1.42 2.89 0.043 0.024 0.0056 0.19*** 0.081
(0.085) (5.27) (3.77) (0.085) (0.15) (0.026) (0.063) (0.065)
post*T2 0.086 2.01 0.48 0.16** 0.12 0.0026 0.031 0.010
(0.068) (4.14) (2.81) (0.070) (0.11) (0.028) (0.055) (0.052)
post*female 0.023 2.91 2.92 0.056 0.13 0.031 0.058 0.033
(0.064) (3.91) (2.34) (0.059) (0.10) (0.028) (0.073) (0.077)
post*female*T1 0.025 3.83 2.72 0.12 0.036 0.022 0.0071 0.0060
(0.11) (6.48) (4.60) (0.10) (0.18) (0.038) (0.096) (0.099)
post*female*T2 0.029 0.73 6.06 0.033 0.00074 0.090* 0.14* 0.028
(0.100) (6.31) (4.34) (0.088) (0.16) (0.047) (0.086) (0.079)
Observations 4496 4473 4496 4496 4496 4496 4496 4496
Mean female teacher 0.59 115 140 0.73 18.2 0.096 0.48 0.32
Mean male teacher 0.61 118 140 0.76 18.1 0.11 0.48 0.30
Note: The dependent variable of each regression is specified in the column header. All regressions include teacher fixed effects. Coefficients of T1 and T2 are absorbed by the
teacher fixed effects. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Fig. 2. Evolution of SET scores by teacher gender, and groups. Note: each point of each subgraph indicates the mean SET score by gender – women (solid line) or men (dashed
line) – and period – first decile completed, second decile completed. . . Subgraphs (a), (b) and (c) present the evolution in treatment one, treatment two and control campuses
respectively. Subgraph (d) presents the same evolution in treatment two campuses, the year before the experiment. Segments indicate the confidence interval at 10%. The
vertical line corresponds to the moment when the administration sent-out the emails. The right-hand side of this bar is therefore the ‘‘post” period.
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Fig. 3. Difference in SET scores before and after emails, after controlling for teacher fixed effects, by group and gender. Note: each bar indicates the difference in SET scores
before and after emails for different groups (control, treatment one, or treatment two) and gender (women or men). Segments indicate the confidence interval at 5%.
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and each group into ten subgroups based on when the students
completed the evaluations: first decile (the first 10% that students
completed in this group, for this teacher gender, during the evalu-
ation period), second decile, etc. As the emails were sent after
20.9% (treatment one), and 22.2% (treatment two) were completed,
the first two deciles constitute the pre-period, the third a ‘‘partially
treated group” and the last seven deciles constitute the post period.
Subfigure 2a presents the evolution in scores for male and female
teachers in campuses included in treatment group one, 2b for
treatment group two, and 2c for the control group. Subfigure 2d
presents the evolution in campuses included in treatment group
two for the year preceding the experiment.
On average, men’s SET scores are greater than women’s scores.
In treatment group one and the control group, SET scores of both
female and male teachers do not seem to have changed signifi-
cantly after the emails were sent. Fig. 2a and c also do not show
a clear gender gap before the treatment in these groups. However,
Fig. 2b suggests that female teachers’ scores in treatment two cam-
puses increased after the treatment, whereas male teachers’ scores
do not seem to have been impacted by the treatment. The evolu-
tion observed in treatment two the year of the experiment did
not occur the year before (subgraph 2d). Male students seem to
mainly drive the change observed in treatment two campuses (ap-
pendix Fig. D1).5 The graphical evidence suggests that treatment
two increased women’s SET scores. However, this pattern could be
driven by the timing of the evaluations. Indeed, ‘‘good” and ‘‘bad”
teachers could be evaluated at different points in time, and this evo-
lution could drive the differences observed in Fig. 2. A simple way to
tackle this issue is to measure the evolution of the SET scores by
group and gender after controlling for teacher fixed effects. In this5 This finding is consistent with the fact that the gender gap in male students’
scores was much larger (0.35 for male students, vs 0.08 for female students, in
treatment two campuses for the pre-period, see Table D1). Furthermore, the
informational email specifically mentioned that male students were particularly
responsible for the gender gap.
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case, we simply aggregate the evolution by teacher. The results
(Fig. 3) are consistent with the ones presented in Fig. 2: women’s
scores increased after the informational treatment.4.2. Main results
Table 3 presents the main results of the effects of the two treat-
ments on the overall satisfaction scores using difference-in-
difference analyses (following Equation (1)). Regressions include
controls for students’ observable characteristics (age, whether
the student is French, continuous assessment and final exam
grades, average grades in other courses, and admission type), as
well as teacher fixed effects.
The coefficients for the main variables of interest for women
and men are shown in columns (1) and (2), where we restrict the
dataset to the students who received the emails (TT1 and TT2)
and the students of the control group. These regressions therefore
exclude the control students who did not receive an email in the
treatment campuses (TC1 and TC2). The results show that treat-
ment two increased female teachers’ SET scores (column 1). After
the mailing campaign, the informational treatment induced a sig-
nificant increase of 0.26 point for women. The purely normative
treatment had no significant effect. The effects of treatment one
and two are not statistically different. The effects of both treat-
ments on male teachers’ SET scores are not statistically significant.
In columns (3) and (4), we show the effect of the treatments in
all groups following equation (2), as well as the p-values of the test
of equality of the effects among subgroups. In these regressions, we
therefore include all students, even those who did not receive an
email in the treatment campuses (sample sizes are therefore larger
than in columns 1 and 2). Once again, the results suggest that
treatment two increased women’s SET scores (column 3). This
increase is observed both among those who received the email
and those who did not, on the treatment two campuses. The differ-
ence between the effects on these two groups is not significant and
the coefficients are similar (0.27 and 0.36 respectively). The spil-
Table 3
Main effects, fall semester courses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Women Men Women Men Women Men All
Post 0.079 0.016 0.071 0.021 0.072 0.021 0.026
(0.090) (0.078) (0.090) (0.076) (0.089) (0.076) (0.077)
post*TC1 0.19 0.070
(0.14) (0.11)
post*TT1 0.091 0.17 0.078 0.17
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12)
post*TC2 0.35*** 0.017
(0.13) (0.096)
post*TT2 0.26** 0.054 0.26** 0.053
(0.13) (0.099) (0.13) (0.098)
post*T1 0.13 0.10 0.10
(0.11) (0.097) (0.098)








Observations 1025 1542 1727 2746 1727 2746 4473
pval T1 T2 0.19 0.33 0.075 0.36
pval TC1 TT1 0.40 0.40
pval TC2 TT2 0.51 0.67
pval TT1 TT2 0.13 0.30
pval female*T1female*T2 0.03
Diff-in-diff Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Triple diff Yes
Note: All regressions include teacher fixed effects and control variables for students (student gender, age, whether the student is French, and variables to control for academic
ability and admissions type). Coefficients of variables TC1, TC2, TT1, TT2, T1 and T2 are absorbed by the teacher fixed effects in columns (1), (2), (5), (6) and (7). In order to
simplify the table, coefficients of variables TT1 and TT2 are not presented in columns (3) and (4). They are not significant. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05.
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scores did not change significantly following treatment two.
Once again, we find no significant impact of treatment one on
SET scores.
The fact that both the students who received the email and
those who did not receive the email in treatment two campuses
react similarly may be surprising. While our sample size does not
enable us to further explore this result, anecdotal evidence indi-
cates that students extensively discussed the email in treatment
two campuses. In June, after the end of the year, we sent an email
to students, asking whether they had discussed the content of the
email with one another. Several students mentioned that they did
indeed discuss the email with other fellow students.6 The study
was also published on the Facebook group of the feminist chapter
on one campus, de facto treating other students from the campus.
These anecdotal pieces of evidence are consistent with the timing
of male and female teachers’ SET evolution in treatment two among
students who received or did not receive the email. While results are
noisy because of small sample sizes, it seems that female teachers’
SET scores by students receiving the email started to increase right
after the email was sent. There appears to be a small lag in the
increase in scores among those who did not receive the email, but
who ended-up being treated through discussions with their peers
(appendix Fig. D2).
Given this evidence of within campus spillover effects, we
measure the effect of the treatments without distinguishing
between students treated directly (those who received the
email) and students treated indirectly (those who did not
receive the email but who were in treated campuses). Results
in columns (5) and (6) of Table 3 show that treatment two6 For instance, one student said: ‘‘I remember this email very well because it
created a long debate/discussion among my group of friends and I.”
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had a significant effect on women’s SET scores, both in compar-
ison to the control group (the coefficient is significant), as well
as in comparison to the treatment one group (see the weakly
significant p-value of the test of equality between the effect of
treatments one and two, assuming complete spillover within
each campus). Finally, this analysis confirms that treatment
one does not appear to have had a statistically significant impact
on either women or men.
These results are confirmed by triple-difference analyses. Col-
umn (7) shows the results of regressions including all overall sat-
isfaction scores across all campuses. Female teachers in
treatment two campuses received higher overall satisfaction scores
after the emails were sent (the coefficient on postt  T2 Womante
shows a statistically significant increase of 0.28 point, around
30% of the standard deviation of the outcome). The p-value of
the test of equality between the effect of treatments one and two
on female instructors is statistically significant. While the treat-
ment does not close the gap in scores completely on the treatment
two campuses, female teachers fare better following the emails.
Their mean overall satisfaction scores increase from 3 to 3.15 out
of 4 (Table D1). The gap in mean scores between female and male
teachers shrinks, from a gap of 0.19 point before the email, to 0.10
after the email (about a 47% drop in the gap).
The effects presented in Table 3 are consistent with the finding
that the purely normative statement had no effect on gender dis-
crimination, while the informational treatment decreased it. We
interpret these results as the effect of additional information on
related behavior. This effect of providing information could be
(partly or fully) driven by the discussion triggered by the email.
Whether the informational treatment would have had the same
effect in the absence of such discussions remains an open question.
Alternative explanations cannot be fully ruled out. Indeed, our
results could also be interpreted as saliency–the issue of discrimi-
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ing– male students were specifically targeted. The fact that male
students reacted while female students did not, makes an explana-
tion based purely on saliency less likely. Our results could also be
interpreted as an experimenter demand effect: students simply
reacting in the expected direction. However, the fact that the effect
survives in the middle run (see Section 5) provides some reassur-
ing evidence that students did not only react when they were
asked to do so. Lastly, the difference between the effects of treat-
ment one and two could come from the original gender gap exist-
ing before the treatments. Indeed, as observed in Fig. 2, the gender
gap in SET scores was large (0.19 for women) and significant in
treatment two campuses but not significant in control and treat-
ment one campuses. In this context we could not exclude that
treatment two worked better simply because there was more room
for change.
In the appendix Table D2, we show that our main results are
robust to perturbations of the main specification. In the first three
columns we present the results of the triple difference-in-
difference when using ordered logits instead of ordinary least
squares, controlling for student fixed effects, and controlling for
both teacher and student fixed effects (in a model including SET
scores of both the fall and spring semesters). The results remain
similar in magnitude and significant at the 5% level. The next three
columns deal with various ways of clustering the standard errors.
We first cluster at the campus level, as this is the main unit of ran-
domization (column 4).7 We then cluster at the student (column 5)
and teacher (column 6) levels, as exogeneous shocks could affect all
the SETs completed by one student or all the evaluations of one tea-
cher. While these various ways of clustering seem legitimate,
Table D2 indicates that the significativity of the main result is not
affected by the clustering choice. Using a binary outcome, we find
that all the effect comes from the margin between ‘‘average” and
‘‘good” overall satisfaction scores. No effect is observed at the mar-
gins between ‘‘bad” and ‘‘average” or between ‘‘good” and ‘‘excel-
lent”. The fact that the effect is localized at one margin and not
from a shift of the entire distribution makes an explanation based
on a behavioral response less likely.
Our results are also robust to alternative specifications. First,
using difference-in-differences in each group with male teachers
as control leads to similar results (Table D3). In comparison to
men, women tend to obtain higher SET scores after the emails in
treatment two (column 3), but not in control (column 1) nor treat-
ment one (column 2) campuses. Second, using SET scores from
2014-2015 (the preceding year), we measure, for each campus
(Table D4, columns 1–7) or group (Table D4, columns 8–10), the
effects of completing evaluations in the last two weeks of the eval-
uation period,8 studying in 2015–2016 (the year of the experiment),
and the interaction of the two: completing the evaluation in the post
period when studying in 2015–2016 (the period of the treatment).
We find results similar to the ones presented in Table 3: no effect
of the purely normative treatment, and an increase in female teach-
ers’ SET scores after the informational treatment. We also find that
the effect of the informational treatment is observed in both Paris
and Le Havre, the two treated campuses, even though the email pre-
sented results obtained in Paris exclusively. These results rule-out
the idea that Parisian students were particularly primed by the infor-
mational email. This analysis also suggests that cultural differences
of students in treatment one versus treatment two campuses are
unlikely to be driving the results. Indeed, treatment one had no sig-7 While natural, this level of clustering is problematic because of the small number
of units (only 7). For this reason, we did not use it in the main specification.
8 More precisely, we divide the evaluation period in two: the first 23% and the
remaining 77%.
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nificant effect in any of the three treatment one campuses, whereas
we find an effect in both treatment two campuses.
We also find no effect in a placebo exercise (appendix Table D2,
column 10).5. Mechanisms
We first focus on the differences of the effects based on student
gender. Indeed, Boring (2017) found that male students were the
ones who had a bias in favor of male teachers, generating higher
overall satisfaction scores for male teachers in the Paris campus.
The treatment two email explicitly referred to this difference
among students. Two mechanisms could drive our main results.
First, male students, who were mainly responsible for the gender
gap in scores, may have corrected their biases following the infor-
mation they received. Second, female students may have tried to
counterbalance the biases through positive discrimination.
In order to further investigate these hypotheses, we run our
main model on male and female students separately. Results
are presented in the first two columns of Table 4. They show
that, after treatment two, male students gave higher overall sat-
isfaction scores to female teachers. Female students were not
affected. Even though the difference between the two effects
is not statistically significant because of small sample sizes,
these results indicate that the informational treatment seems
to have reduced male students’ gender biases, without creating
positive discrimination. Male students’ mean ratings of female
teachers increased by 0.31 points, from 2.89 to 3.2 after the
informational email. Although there remains a 0.12-point gap
with the way that male students rated male teachers on treat-
ment two campuses (mean score of 3.32 for male teachers after
the email), this gap is smaller than the one in the post period in
the control group (0.21) and in treatment one (0.26). As a final
comparison, the gap found by Boring (2017) on the Paris cam-
pus in previous years, between the way that male students
rated male and female teachers’ overall satisfaction scores,
was equal to 0.19.
Second, we measure whether treatment two impacted all
female teachers or mainly benefited the higher quality teachers.
We define a ‘‘good teacher” as a teacher who generated more
learning in students, measured as a teacher whose students
received higher average grades on the final exam (above the med-
ian grade within campus). Teaching to the test and grade leniency
are not an issue for the final exam in our context. Indeed, the final
exam is designed by the main lecturer and is common to all stu-
dents. This feature enables us to compare student learning across
instructors. Students’ final exams are also graded by a different
teacher than the one they had during the semester. The grading
is anonymous (double blind), and it takes place after students have
completed their SETs for the semester. This feature specifically pre-
vents grade leniency. Results of regressions separating the better
teachers from the other teachers are presented in columns (3)
and (4) of Table 4. They indicate that the higher quality female
teachers especially benefitted from the higher overall satisfaction
scores with treatment two.
Third, we measure whether ‘‘good” students reacted differently.
We define ‘‘good” students as those who obtained above the med-
ian final grades within campus. Results are presented in
columns (5) and (6) of Table 4. This analysis does not yield statis-
tically significant results, suggesting that both types of students
may have increased the overall satisfaction scores of female
teachers.99 Results are similar when ‘‘good students” are defined as students who get final
grades above the median within campus in other courses (not shown).
Table 4
Mechanism of the effect.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Students Teacher’s quality Student’s level Length of the effect
Male Female >median <median >median <median
post 0.021 0.015 0.028 0.030 0.067 0.033 0.030
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.100) (0.12) (0.099) (0.078)
post*T1 0.24 0.077 0.19 0.076 0.013 0.21 0.076
(0.16) (0.13) (0.17) (0.12) (0.14) (0.13) (0.099)
post*T2 0.037 0.047 0.0016 0.066 0.030 0.081 0.021
(0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.088)
post*female 0.16 0.065 0.14 0.066 0.011 0.24 0.11
(0.18) (0.16) (0.15) (0.23) (0.16) (0.17) (0.12)
post*female*T1 0.17 0.091 0.083 0.11 0.11 0.17 0.059
(0.24) (0.20) (0.21) (0.26) (0.21) (0.22) (0.15)
post*female*T2 0.44** 0.14 0.32* 0.21 0.21 0.33 0.27*













Observations 1766 2707 2154 2319 2369 2104 8655
Note: Fall semester only in the first six columns. Fall and spring semesters in column (7). All regressions include control variables and teacher fixed effects. Coefficients of
variables T1 and T2 are absorbed by the teacher fixed effects in all columns. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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run effect. We do so by introducing the spring semester SET scores
in the sample, and running our main regression with additional
parameters for ‘‘spring”; ‘‘spring*T1”; ‘‘spring*T2”; spring*female”;
spring*female*T1”; and ‘‘spring*female*T2”. The effect of the infor-
mational treatment remains significant during the spring seme-
ster: female teachers improved their scores. The normative
treatment remained ineffective. The pre period becomes the refer-
ence for the evaluations filled both in the fall semester after the
emails were sent (for similar courses given by same teachers),
and in the spring semester (with other courses and mostly other
teachers). The identification of the effect in the spring semester
is therefore weaker. Nonetheless, these results do not fit with an
explanation based on a purely behavioral response to the email.
As students’ behavior changed in the medium run, this result
seems to indicate that students gained a better understanding of
their own behavior.
In appendix Table D5, we explore the effect of the treatments on
the different teaching dimensions that the students also evaluate.
Surprisingly, while only treatment two decreased the gender gap
in overall satisfaction scores, the two different treatments seem
to have the same effect on the teaching dimensions and may have
actually reinforced gender stereotypes.10 For instance, women’s
scores in ‘‘quality of instructional materials” or ‘‘clarity of course
assessment” are significantly better after both treatments. These
questions tended to be more favorable to female instructors, accord-
ing to Boring (2017). We also find that all teachers’ scores in ‘‘contri-
bution to intellectual development” are significantly higher after the
treatment. Boring (2017) found that (male) students were particu-
larly biased on this item, as well as on an instructor’s class leader-10 When we adjust the p-values for multiple hypothesis testing in this Table by
calculating Anderson’s sharpened False Discovery Rate q-values, we find that the
effects are not significant, suggesting that these results may not be very robust.
10ship/quality of animation skills. We do not find evidence of a
closing of the gender gap for these two questions. Both items were
mentioned in the informational treatment, but it seems that stu-
dents did not pay as much attention to these items, possibly because
the treatment mentioned them only briefly and towards the end of
the email. Other teaching dimensions do not seem to be impacted.
However, we do find a positive effect of treatment two for women
on what should be an objective item: how many grades
students received during the semester. This result confirms previous
research suggesting that students’ evaluations remain
subjective even on what should be purely objective criteria
(Boring et al., 2016).
6. Conclusion
What constitutes an effective way to educate students about
their own biases, and how can universities apply these results to
reduce biases in SETs in their own contexts? One policy advice
would be to remain cautious about the content of the awareness-
raising message the administration sends to students. Our results
suggest that simply telling students not to discriminate using a
blanket administrative statement is likely to be ineffective. How-
ever engaging students in discussions about the role that discrim-
ination plays in SET scores and presenting them with the large
body of evidence that now exists can be efficient to reduce discrim-
ination in scores. This strategy can be useful for universities that
are reconsidering their use of SETs because of the existence of gen-
der biases.
How should universities engage students about discrimina-
tion in SET scores? Some instructors may worry that, if they
are the ones who try to encourage students to treat all profes-
sors equally, the intervention may backfire against them indi-
vidually. To avoid uncomfortable and potentially
counterproductive situations for instructors, it may be neces-
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administration, and not the instructors being evaluated. Fur-
thermore, the administration must beware to avoid potential
counterproductive activations of stereotypes through the anti-
bias intervention (Dobbin and Kalev, 2018).
Further work needs to be conducted in order to fully under-
stand the type of information that maximizes the impact. In
the context of this research we used precise information on
discrimination within the same university. The efficiency of
similar messages displaying results obtained in another univer-
sity or on related but not identical behavior remains an open
question.
Finally, we believe that our results have broader implications.
One of the main conclusions of our field experiment is that the con-
tent of an awareness-raising campaign is important. Poorly
designed messages can be ineffective, which may explain the per-
sistence of discrimination despite millions of dollars spent every
year by firms, governmental agencies and non-governmental orga-
nizations on anti-discrimination campaigns. Our results
suggest that these campaigns, which resemble our normative
treatment, are likely to be inefficient. Similar results have been
found on the efficiency of awareness-raising health campaigns,
such as information campaigns designed to reduce anti-
vaccination beliefs (Horne et al., 2015; Nyhan et al., 2014; Nyhan
and Reifler, 2015).Acknowledgements
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acknowledged.Appendix A. The survey questions
Students can give an ‘‘excellent”, ‘‘good”, ‘‘average”, ‘‘insuffi-
cient” or ‘‘not applicable” rating to the following questions:
(1) How do you evaluate the preparation and the organization
of classes?
(2) How do you evaluate the quality of the teaching
materials?
(3) How do you evaluate the clarity of the assessment criteria?
(4) How do you evaluate the usefulness of feedback?
(5) How do you evaluate your teacher’s class leadership / qual-
ity of animation skills?
(6) How do you evaluate your teacher’s ability to encourage
group work?
(7) How do you evaluate your teacher’s availability and commu-
nication skills?
(8) How do you evaluate the course’s ability to relate to current
issues?
(9) How do you evaluate your teacher’s contribution to your
intellectual development?
(10) What is your overall level of satisfaction?
The survey includes the following additional questions:
(11) Compared with other courses this semester, I invested much
more effort / as much effort / much less effort in this course.
(12) How many assessments did you have throughout the seme-
ster? 0 to 2, 3 to 4, 5 to 6, 7 or more.
(13) Were written assignments given back within deadlines? Yes
/ No
(14) Were oral presentation grades given back within deadlines?
Yes / No
Finally, the survey includes two open-ended questions (which
we do not analyze here):
(15) What are the strong points of this course?
(16) What are the points that the teacher could improve?
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Each email included a message in French, followed by the Eng-
lish version. We only reproduce the English versions below.
Email one (purely normative treatment):
Dear Student,
This fall semester’s student evaluations of teaching are open
since Monday November 23rd. These evaluations, which are
mandatory for students to complete, are read by your instructors
and closely analyzed by the Direction des études et de la scolarité
in order to prepare the upcoming academic year. Your comments
are extremely useful for the administration of Sciences Po in order
to improve the quality of our programs, in close collaboration with
our teaching staff.
Considering the importance of these evaluations,wewould like to
remindyou that your evaluationsmust exclusively focus on thequal-
ity of the teaching andmust not be influenced by criteria such as the
instructor’s gender, age or ethnicity. We ask you to pay close atten-
tion to these discrimination issues when completing your student
evaluations. The goal is to avoid a situation in which, for instance,
gender-based biases or stereotypes would systematically generate



















































Female student rating a male instructor Male student rating a female instructor
Female student rating a female instructor Male student rating a male instructorBest regards,
Signature of the Gender Equality Officer
Email two (informational treatment):
Dear Student,
In this period of student evaluations of teaching (SET), we
would like to bring your attention to the results of a recent study
which suggests the existence of gender biases against female
instructors of first year undergraduate seminars (i.e. the con-
férences de méthode) for all fundamental courses.
Indeed, the results of this study show that students tend to give
lower ratings to their female instructors despite the fact that stu-
dents perform equally well on final exams, whether their seminar
instructor was a man or a woman. Male students in particular tend
to rate male instructors higher in their student evaluations,
although a slight bias by female students also exists. The differ-
ences in SET scores do not appear to be justified by other measures13of teaching quality, such as an instructor’s ability to make their stu-
dents succeed on their final exams.
Let’s take the example of students whose seminar average grade
is 13.5 and the final exam grade is 12 (these grades correspond to
the student averages observed during the period 2008–2013, pool-
ing all fundamental courses together). Given these students,
female seminar instructors have a 30% chance of obtaining an ‘‘ex-
cellent” overall satisfaction score, from both male and female stu-
dents (and keeping constant course characteristics, such as the day
and time of class). Given these grades, however, male instructors
have a 33% of obtaining an ‘‘excellent” overall satisfaction score
when evaluated by a female student and even a 42% chance when
evaluated by a male student. These results mean that given an
equal performance on exams, female instructors are 19% less likely
to obtain ‘‘excellent” overall satisfaction scores compared to male
instructors (taking into account the proportion of male and female
students). These differences are statistically significant.
Furthermore, male students systematically rate male instruc-
tors higher, no matter students’ results on final exams, as shown
in the graph below.
Graph: Correlation between students’ final exam grades and the
predicted probability of giving an ‘‘excellent” overall satisfaction
score, by student and instructor genderFinally, the results of this study suggest that students apply
gender stereotypes in the way they respond to more specific ques-
tions, such as an instructor’s class leadership/quality of animation
skills or the ability to contribute to students’ intellectual
development.
Given these results, we would like to remind you that your eval-
uations must exclusively focus on the quality of the teaching and
must not be influenced by criteria such as the instructor’s gender,
age or ethnicity.We ask you to pay close attention to these discrim-
ination issues when completing your student evaluations. The goal
is to avoid a situation in which, for instance, gender-based biases or
stereotypes would systematically generate lower evaluations for
women instructors compared to their male colleagues.
Best regards,
Signature of the Gender Equality Officer
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This appendix presents additional tables mentioned in the
paper.Table D1
Descriptive statistics on students and teachers, by campus group, before and after emails.
Control
Before After
Mean S.d. Mean S.d.
Panel A. Students
Share of women 0.58 0.49 0.60 0.49
Age 18.24 0.81 18.49 1.04
Continuous assessment (seminar) grade 147.29 24.37 143.9 24.81
Final exam grade 118.36 33.55 114.86 35.86
Share of French citizenship 0.58 0.49 0.55 0.50
Share of Specific admissions procedure 0.03 0.17 0.01 0.11
Share of Entry exam admissions procedure 0.25 0.44 0.25 0.43
Share of International admissions procedure 0.70 0.46 0.71 0.45
Panel B. Teachers
Share of women 0.44 0.50 0.46 0.50
Share of ‘‘Excellent” scores 0.44 0.50 0.42 0.49
Share of ‘‘Good” scores 0.37 0.48 0.36 0.48
Share of ‘‘Average” scores 0.13 0.33 0.14 0.35
Share of ‘‘Insufficient” scores 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.26
History scores 3.00 0.89 3.05 0.84
Law scores 3.32 0.89 3.21 0.96
Microeconomics scores 3.24 0.84 3.12 0.93
Scores: male students for female teachers 3.28 0.93 3.07 0.98
Scores: male students for male teachers 3.37 0.71 3.28 0.81
Scores: female students for female teachers 3.14 0.93 3.08 1.00
Scores: male students for male teachers 3.09 0.90 3.12 0.87
Note: ‘‘Scores” refer to overall satisfaction scores.
Table D2
Robustness checks.
14Table D1 shows descriptive statistics by group (control, treat-
ment one, and treatment two) and by time period (before and after
the emails).
Tables D2, D3 and D4 present some robustness checks of our
main results. In Table D2 we present perturbations of our main
specification. Column (1) presents the results when using orderedTreatment one Treatment two
Before After Before After
Mean S.d. Mean S.d. Mean S.d. Mean S.d.
0.69 0.46 0.58 0.49 0.60 0.49 0.61 0.49
18.09 0.60 18.24 0.83 17.88 0.43 18.04 0.63
140.79 21.36 139.91 22.95 141.6 21.27 137.32 21.45
125.74 30.19 122.54 32.27 113.79 34.61 112.64 35.2
0.75 0.44 0.58 0.49 0.97 0.18 0.86 0.35
0.04 0.20 0.04 0.19 0.18 0.38 0.18 0.38
0.49 0.50 0.29 0.45 0.68 0.47 0.63 0.48
0.38 0.49 0.51 0.50 0.05 0.22 0.09 0.29
0.46 0.50 0.39 0.49 0.33 0.47 0.36 0.48
0.36 0.48 0.35 0.48 0.42 0.49 0.44 0.50
0.38 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.36 0.48 0.38 0.49
0.15 0.36 0.17 0.38 0.15 0.36 0.14 0.34
0.11 0.31 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.25 0.04 0.20
3.07 0.88 3.09 0.87 3.20 0.86 3.39 0.72
2.84 1.03 3.03 0.95 3.10 0.94 3.11 0.88
3.04 1.01 2.91 0.91 3.10 0.93 3.15 0.87
2.96 1.04 2.96 0.92 2.89 0.98 3.20 0.83
2.85 1.10 3.22 0.90 3.24 0.93 3.32 0.82
3.13 0.87 2.92 0.91 3.08 0.88 3.10 0.86
2.94 0.98 2.96 0.90 3.16 0.88 3.21 0.83
Table D3
Robustness checks, difference-in-difference with male as control group.
(1) (2) (3)
Difference in difference
Control Treatment 1 Treatment 2
Post 0.022 0.11* 0.048
(0.074) (0.061) (0.043)
Post*female 0.078 0.079 0.18**
(0.12) (0.094) (0.077)
Observations 654 1503 2316
Note: All regressions include teacher fixed effects and control variables for students (student gender, age, whether the student is French, and variables to control for academic
ability and admissions type). Significance levels: ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table D4
Robustness checks, using year 2014–2015.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Triple difference in difference using the preceding year
Dijon Nancy Menton Poitiers Reims Le Havre Paris Control group T1 T2
Post 0.11 0.026 0.039 0.10 0.19* 0.13 0.15*** 0.042 0.081 0.15***
(0.12) (0.11) (0.15) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13) (0.040) (0.085) (0.072) (0.038)
Post*female 0.029 0.038 0.13 0.24 0.23 0.41** 0.16** 0.0072 0.10 0.21***
(0.21) (0.16) (0.21) (0.18) (0.14) (0.20) (0.069) (0.13) (0.098) (0.066)
Post*year2015 0.31* 0.049 0.068 0.32* 0.061 0.20 0.085 0.015 0.039 0.10*
(0.17) (0.14) (0.24) (0.19) (0.13) (0.17) (0.061) (0.11) (0.092) (0.057)
Post* year2015 0.023 0.044 0.54 0.22 0.051 0.93*** 0.27** 0.076 0.010 0.39***
*female (0.28) (0.21) (0.54) (0.25) (0.17) (0.29) (0.11) (0.17) (0.13) (0.10)
Observations 475 814 544 507 1543 720 4268 1289 2594 4988
Note: The sample includes the evaluation completed in the first semester of school year 2014–2015 (before the experiment) and 2015–2016 (year of the experiment). All
regressions are based on Equation (4). ‘‘Post” is a dummy equal to one if the evaluation is filled in the last 77% of the evaluation period. ‘‘year2015” is a dummy equal to one
for the year of the experiment. ‘‘Female” is a dummy equal to one if the seminar teacher is a woman. All regressions include teacher fixed effects and control variables for
students (student gender, age, whether the student is French, and variables to control for academic ability and admissions type). Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
A. Boring and A. Philippe Journal of Public Economics 193 (2021) 104323logit estimations instead of OLS. Column (2) presents the results
when using SET scores for both fall and spring semesters, and
including student fixed effects instead of teacher fixed effects in
the regressions. Column (3) presents the results when using SET
scores for both fall and spring semesters, and adding student and
teacher fixed effects. Columns (4) to (6) present the main specifica-
tion (Column 7, Table 3) with standard errors clustered at the cam-
pus (column 4), teacher (column 5), or student level (column 6).
Columns (7) to (9) present the results when using dummies equal
to one if the SET overall satisfaction score is superior or equal to
‘‘average” (column (7)), ‘‘good” (column (8)) or ‘‘excellent” (column
(9)). Results are similar to those presented in Table 3.15In the last column of Table D2, we present a placebo exercise
where we run our main regression on scores in 2014–2015, one
year before our experiment took place.
In Table D3, we present the results of difference-in-differences
in control, treatment one and treatment two campuses with male
teachers used as control. While the coefficients for post*Female are
not significant (and negative) in control and treatment one groups,
the coefficient is positive and significant in treatment two. These
results are consistent with the ones presented in Table 3.
In Table D4, we test the robustness of our results when using
the year before the experiment to build a control group. We run
regressions of the following form:
‘
Table D5
Effect of the treatment on different dimensions of teaching.






























post 0.075 0.13 0.0031 0.014 0. 47 0.085 0.041 0.0073
(0.075) (0.10) (0.094) (0.10) (0.0 64) (0.063) (0.043) (0.046)
post*T1 0.20** 0.085 0.16 0.0063 0.19 057 0.043 0.10** 0.039
(0.097) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.1 81) (0.078) (0.052) (0.057)
post*T2 0.077 0.094 0.058 0.064 0.11 022 0.075 0.037 0.016
(0.086) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.0 73) (0.074) (0.046) (0.050)
post*female 0.079 0.32** 0.24* 0.060 0.13 48 0.24** 0.028 0.062
(0.12) (0.14) (0.13) (0.15) (0.1 0) (0.10) (0.050) (0.055)
post*female*T1 0.15 0.32* 0.32* 0.24 0. .14 0.19 0.025 0.012
(0.15) (0.17) (0.17) (0.19) (0.1 3) (0.12) (0.065) (0.074)
post*female*T2 0.018 0.41** 0.28* 0.19 0. .053 0.27** 0.019 0.064
(0.14) (0.17) (0.16) (0.18) (0.1 2) (0.12) (0.057) (0.062)
Observations 4472 4473 4472 4473 447 3 4471 4472 4463
Mean outcome 3.18 3.03 2.96 2.89 3.05 2 2.46 1.86 1.84
Sd outcome 0.87 1.02 0.98 1.04 0.96 3 0.83 0.35 0.37
Note: The dependent variable of each regression is specified in the column header. All reg er, age, whether the student is French, and variables to







































































































































































062 0.31** 0.021 0.078 0.080 0.0
78) (0.15) (0.094) (0.12) (0.080) (0.0
* 0.11 0.052 0.0051 0.30*** 0.0
1) (0.19) (0.12) (0.15) (0.11) (0.0
0.29* 0.022 0.035 0.15* 0.0
90) (0.17) (0.10) (0.13) (0.093) (0.0
0.057 0.062 0.055 0.044 0.0
3) (0.23) (0.15) (0.19) (0.12) (0.1
12 0.11 0.054 0.096 0.088 0
6) (0.28) (0.18) (0.24) (0.17) (0.1
024 0.17 0.13 0.090 0.048 0
5) (0.25) (0.17) (0.21) (0.15) (0.1
2 4466 4470 4470 4473 447
2.30 3.20 3.00 3.06 2.3
1.36 0.92 1.14 0.96 0.6
ressions include teacher fixed effects and control variables for students (student gend
















































































































































































































































Fig. D2. Evolution of SET scores by teacher gender in treatment two campuses,
students receiving the email or not. Note: each point indicates the mean SET score
by gender (women-solid line or men-dashed line), and timing of evaluation (first
decile completed, second decile completed, etc.). Subfigure (a) presents the
evolution among students who received the email in treatment two, while
subfigure (b) presents the same evolution for students who did not receive the
email. Segments indicate the confidence interval at 10%.
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